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Converging Numbers: Harmonization of Accounting Standards in the Context 
of the Role of the Auditor in Corporate Governance 
Poonam Puri* 
Introduction 
The recent financial collapse of Enron and other corporate powerhouses as well as the 
demise of accounting firm Arthur Andersen brings into question the credibility of the 
auditor’s role in corporate governance. This article comments on the harmonization of 
accounting standards within the context of the role of the auditor in corporate 
governance. 
Separation of Ownership and Control—Corporate Governance 
Berle and Mean’s concerns about the separation of ownership and control in the large 
publicly held corporation are just as relevant in Canada today as they were in the United 
States in the 1930s.1 The separation of ownership and control, that is, the separation of 
shareholding and management, causes concerns for managers acting in their own 
interests rather than in the best interests of shareholders.2 In attempts to reduce the 
divergence of interests between those who control and those who own, we employ an 
* Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. 
1 A.  Berle & G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Macmillan, 
1933). 
2 Corporate law imposes a fiduciary duty on managers to act in the best interest of the corporation, 
which courts have generally interpreted as the best interests of shareholders. There is, however, a 
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array of market mechanisms and legal rules.3 Market mechanisms include contingent 
compensation packages,  and the market for corporate control (take-overs) and the 
market for managers. Mandatory legal rules such as the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty, and the threat of shareholder litigation also act to reduce the divergence 
between shareholder and management interests. 
Another important legal rule requires a corporation to appoint an auditor to review and 
certify its financial statements.4  While most rules in corporate law are default rules 
reflecting the enabling nature of corporate law, this one is a mandatory rule.5  
The auditor’s purpose in corporate governance is to ensure greater accountability of 
management to shareholders and other stakeholders such as creditors, employees, and 
the government, all of whom have a financial interest in the assets controlled by 
management. The auditor’s primary role is to bridge the information and credibility gaps 
that exist between top corporate management and these stakeholders. 
Following generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), the auditor is required to 
methodologically review and objectively examine the financial statements prepared by a 
live debate on whether the best interests of the corporation should include only shareholders, or 
also, other stakeholders, such as creditors, employees, customers and the government.  
3 See generally, A. Shleifer & R. Visney, “A Survey of Corporate Governance” (1997) 52 Journal of 
Finance 737. 
4 Canadian Business Corporations Act, RS 1985, c. C-44, s.162(1) [hereinafter C.B.C.A.].  
5 There is an exception in the C.B.C.A., however, for companies that do not distribute their 
securities to the public. See s. 163(1).  
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company’s management and determine their accuracy in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
An auditor’s independence from her clients is considered to be one of the hallmarks of 
the accounting profession.6 Independence ensures that the auditor will be objective 
when obtaining, reviewing and reporting client information. 
Corporate and securities law rules attempt to give some substance to the principle of 
auditor independence by legislating a specific framework of rights, responsibilities and 
duties under which the auditor must carry out her tasks. 
Corporate law statutes expressly state that an auditor be independent from the 
corporation that she audits. 7 Corporate law statutes also expressly state that the 
shareholders—not management—have the legal authority to appoint the auditor at the 
annual general meeting of shareholders8 As a result, the shareholders of a corporation 
are supposed to appoint the auditor at the annual general meeting of the corporation by 
ordinary resolution.9 The auditor is required to make a report on the financial statements 
before the shareholders at every annual general meeting.10 The auditor can demand all 
6 See concerns about independence. 
7 C.B.C.A., s. 161(1). Independence is defined in s.161(2).  
8 C.B.C.A., s.162(1). 
9 Ibid. 
10 C.B.C.A., s. 155(1)(b).  
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relevant information and access to documents necessary to enable her to make the 
examination.11  
Safeguards have also been put into place at the commencement and termination of the 
relationship to ensure auditor independence. If management removes the current auditor 
or if the current auditor resigns, she is entitled to speak at the next annual general 
meeting to disclose to shareholders the reasons for disagreement and the termination of 
the relationship.12  The corporation must make a statement at the termination of the 
relationship13 and the new auditor is also entitled to this information and may make a 
statement.14  
Despite the presence of these safeguards in corporate statutes, the practical reality of 
the role of the auditor in corporate governance is starkly different than the theory 
suggests. Management of publicly held corporations selects the auditor. Widely 
dispersed, retail shareholders have little or no input in appointing an auditor in the same 
manner that shareholders have little input in the election of the board of directors. 
Although officially appointed by the shareholders, the auditors are paid by the 
management team and rely on them for continued employment. The auditors work 
11 C.B.C.A., s. 169 and 170.  
12 C.B.C.A., s. 168(5). 
13 C.B.C.A., s. 168(5.1)(a). 
14 C.B.C.A., s. 168(7) and 168(5.1)(b). 
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closely and develop relationships with management, not shareholders. Management may 
also provide the auditing firm with lucrative contracts for their non-auditing services. 
Auditors are also reluctant to report on perceived management misconduct because 
they do not want to develop a reputation as whistle-blowers in the corporate 
community. Although management has a legal duty to advise the shareholders as to why 
the previous auditor resigned, it often does not do so in a forthright manner.15 All this 
brings into question the degree of an auditor’s independence from management. 
Because a corporation’s audited financial statements constitute a primary source of 
information by which current and prospective stakeholders evaluate the firm, the 
practical reality of the structure of the audit relationship is very problematic. A large part 
of this problem derives from the fact that that GAAP provides broad standards and 
principles, which allows management the ability to posture and affords auditors too 
much discretion in determining whether management’s financial statements are fair, 
reasonable, and accurate. 
Accounting Standards 
Canadian GAAP are far from being a canonical set of rules that ensure identical 
accounting treatment of identical transactions. Rather than being specific rules, Canadian 
GAAP consists largely of principles and guidelines. GAAP tolerates a range of 
15 C.B.C.A., s. 168(5.1)(a). 
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reasonable treatments, leaving the choice among alternatives to management. The 
purpose of GAAS is to permit auditors to determine whether financial statements 
“present fairly” the business and affairs of a corporation. At times, GAAP can result in 
two identical companies having two different sets of financial statements, both in 
compliance with GAAP  
Financial statements that have the ability to be audited in compliance with GAAP, may 
in some contexts be misleading statements of financial position. Some may consider the 
flexibility in GAAP to be a strength, but the wide scope of discretion afforded to 
auditors may also be a cause for concern because it assists in creating an environment 
where auditors are more likely to succumb to pressure by management to report 
financial data in ways favourable to management.  
 
Harmonization, Generally and Harmonization of Accounting Standards 
 
Having set out a broad framework on corporate governance, the role of the auditor, 
and accounting standards, this section discusses harmonization. International 
harmonization has been attempted in a number of different areas including monetary and 
fiscal policy, contract law, banking law, securities regulation, intellectual property law, 
labour law, environmental law, food safety, product standards and liability law.16  
                                                 
16 David Leebron, “Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework” (1996) 27 C.B.L.J. 63.  
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As David Leebron has argued generally about harmonization, the debate over 
harmonization of accounting standards will be of a greater quality if the underlying 
assumptions and fundamental issues are expressly stated and analysed. 17 Leebron has 
suggested that we ought to ask a number of questions regarding any argument to 
harmonize.  
I use a modified version of Leebron’s inventory of questions to analyze the issue of 
harmonization of accounting standards in a meaningful way. 18 What is the basis of the 
claim that the accounting standards of two or more jurisdictions ought to be the same? 
Why do the accounting standards differ in the first place, and do the reasons for the 
difference suggest additional costs to the process of harmonization? What other costs 
might harmonization entail? What kind of harmonization is needed and to what degree 
must the accounting standards be harmonized? What should the scope of the 
harmonization effort be in order to realize any goals without unnecessary costs or 
distortions? Are there alternatives to harmonization (such as mutual recognition) that 
might serve the goals of the proposed harmonization without entailing some of its 
costs?19 
 
 Benefits of Harmonization of Accounting Standards 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid.  
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Harmonization of accounting standards is not an end in itself. It is a means of achieving 
certain laudable policy objectives. There appear to be two purposes in harmonizing 
accounting standards. The first is greater efficiency resulting from reduced transaction 
costs. The second is greater comparability of companies internationally.  
While harmonizing accounting standards is not necessary to make interjurisdictional 
activity possible in capital markets, it will make it more efficient. Harmonization will 
reduce overall transaction costs because some Canadian companies, (which also issue 
securities in the U.S.), would no longer need to prepare reconciliation statements or an 
entirely new set of financial statements to comply with U.S. GAAP. As well, foreign 
issuers would not have to prepare reconciliations to comply with Canadian GAAP.  
When a company converts its financial statements prepared in accordance with 
Canadian GAAP into U.S. GAAP, net profits decrease by approximately 10 percent, 
because U.S. GAAP are more strict with respect to reporting of revenue and expenses. 
There is no indication in the Canadian Securities Administrators Policy Paper on 
Harmonization of Accounting Standards of how many Canadian and foreign companies 
listed in Canada will benefit from harmonizing accounting standards.  
When Canadian companies are thinking about raising capital on public markets, our 
biggest competitor is the U.S. Is there a real concern that some of these companies 
                                                                                                                                     
18 Ibid.  
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would bypass Canadian capital markets in the absence of harmonization? Would we 
witness a large increase in the number of foreign issuers listed in the U.S. who also 
decide to list or sell securities in Canada if we were to achieve greater harmonization of 
accounting standards?  
If, instead of outright harmonization, we adopt a system of mutual recognition of 
accounting standards so that Canadian issuers could use U.S.GAAP for financial 
reporting under corporate and securities laws, the efficiency gains would be minimal, 
since these Canadian companies would still be required to comply with Canadian 
GAAP for Canadian income tax and other purposes.  
If we create a rule allowing foreign issuers to comply with a foreign jurisdiction’s GAAP 
when doing business in Canada, the transaction costs would be reduced for the foreign 
company. However, the costs would be shifted to third parties—such as retail and 
institutional shareholders and other stakeholders—who may need to prepare their own 
reconciliation of the foreign financial statements to Canadian GAAP, for comparability 
purposes. 
The second purpose of harmonization of accounting standards is greater comparability. 
The argument is that certain Canadian companies would become more competitive in 
attracting capital and credit if they could report their financial statements in U.S. GAAP 
                                                                                                                                     
19 Ibid.  
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because the relevant comparison peer group is large U.S. and other foreign companies. 
If, rather than harmonizing accounting rules, we opt for a less drastic option as 
suggested in the C.S.A. Policy Paper and allow Canadian companies to choose 
whether they want to comply with Canadian or US GAAP, then comparability of 
Canadian companies with each other is actually reduced. It also imposes costs on retail 
and institutional investors who are trying to compare one Canadian company with 
another Canadian company on the basis of the same financial reporting rules. 
 
Sources and Legitimacy of Differences in Accounting Standards  
 
Differences in accounting standards might have value and harmonization may sometimes 
be achieved at the cost of eliminating or reducing those differences. In evaluating the 
claim that accounting standards ought to be harmonized, we must ask why different 
jurisdictions have adopted different standards in the first place.  
The question of why jurisdictions adopt different laws and why Canadian GAAP differs 
from that of other jurisdictions is extremely complex. To answer it requires tools from 
many disciplines, including economics, politics, sociology, and public choice theory.20 
Jurisdictions might differ in many ways, all of which affect the laws and policies they 
adopt.  
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
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Jurisdictions may differ in endowments. Policy decisions both affect and are affected by 
national resources. Jurisdictions differ in the level and quality of financial disclosure 
required of companies, but the level and quality of financial disclosure is itself a function 
of the resources that are allocated to ensuring fair and efficient capital markets  
Jurisdictions may also differ in the preferences and ideologies of its citizens. Identical 
resources do not result in identical social choices. Preferences for accounting standards 
vary. The U.S. prefers specific, rule-like, accounting standards, whereas Canada’s 
accounting standards are slightly more general and formulated as principles.  
The costs of harmonizing accounting standards will depend on the reason for the 
difference in the first place. There are a number of significant differences Canadian and 
U.S. GAAP including accounting for foreign currency denominated debt, business 
combination transactions, accounting changes, income taxes, extraordinary items, 
interest capitalization, and pension costs.  
If these differences between Canadian and American accounting standards derive from 
differences in policies and preferences (for example, differences in income tax policies 
and practices or difference in public and private retirement plan policies), then 
harmonization certainly means that at least one jurisdiction will lose something of value if 
a new standard is implemented. Care ought to be taken in examining why Canada has 
opted for certain accounting standards as opposed to others. Careful attention ought to 
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be paid to our unique income tax system and the unique attributes of our public and 
private pension systems. 
Comparative corporate governance may provide some insight on the historical 
differences in accounting standards, and possibilities for their convergence in the future. 
Historically, the corporate governance structures and policies of bank centred 
economies such as Germany and Japan have been quite different from those found in 
public capital market centered economies such as Canada, the U.S. and England. 
Accounting standards in Germany look like broad statements of policy and principle. 
They are briefly stated and function at a very general level. On the other hand, American 
accounting standards are much more comprehensive, specific, and rule-like. Canadian 
GAAP, while more similar to U.S. than German GAAP, operates at quite a general 
level where principles are articulated but specific rules are not set out. 
In my view, the difference in accounting standards can in part be explained by the 
historical fact that the banks provided most of the capital requirements to German 
corporations, and as a result, had access to financial information about the company. 
They also had the sophistication to interpret the financial data. As a result, there was not 
as much of a demand for specific, rule-like accounting standards. Standards that 
operated at the level of principle and policy were sufficient. The same cannot be said in 
Canada or the U.S., where corporations rely much more heavily on public capital 
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markets to raise funds. Since retail shareholders in the U.S. have little ability to access 
or understand a corporation’s financial data, they rely significantly on the auditor’s seal 
of approval that the financial statements fairly and accurately reflect the financial picture 
of the company. There was a greater dependency on auditors and a greater need for 
more specific rule-like accounting standards.  
In harmonizing accounting standards, we need to pay attention to their level of 
specificity. When accounting standards are written in a detailed fashion, clever managers 
and accountants will find ways to get around the precise wording of the rules. When 
accounting standards are generally stated, perhaps too much faith is placed in the hands 
of the auditor who must apply the standards objectively and in good faith. 
This dilemma is similar to the one encountered when drafting legislation.  Should 
legislators draft clear, specific, bright-line rules that clever lawyers will be able to 
manoeuvre around?  Or should the legislators set out general policies and principles and 
rely on the good faith of the parties who use such laws and the good judgment and the 
independence of the judges who interpret them? 
Given the poor judgment that has been exercised by some auditors in the recent past, 
perhaps specific, rule-like accounting standards are more appropriate. But, given that 
the U.S. has the most rule-like standards of all jurisdictions, and was not able to avert 
the collapse of Enron, where does this leave us? Clearly this means that we cannot rely 
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exclusively on changes to accounting standards to solve the corporate governance crisis 
that we currently face. 
Conclusion 
 
Before any conclusions can be drawn on harmonizing accounting standards, one must 
pay serious attention to the costs and benefits of harmonization and the reasons for 
historical differences in accounting standards. Harmonization can be achieved through a 
number of different procedures. My view is that, rather than simply adopting U.S. 
GAAP or passing over authority on accounting standards to an international institution, 
control over accounting standards ought to remain within Canadian institutions. Making 
decisions about accounting standards at a more local level has both substantive and 
procedural value.21 The substantive value is that that the local population (Canadian 
companies, auditors and stakeholders) is able to implement choices that better reflect its 
ideologies, preferences, and resources.22 The procedural value of localism is one of 
participation, or having a more meaningful say and more direct influence over the polices 
that affect the quality and quantity of accounting standards.23 
Implicit in the claim for harmonization of accounting standards is that Canada is less 
competitive in the global capital markets if our standards are different than those of 
other jurisdictions and in particular, the United States. Even if we do harmonize 
                                                 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
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accounting standards, comparability may be difficult to achieve because accounting 
standards almost always provide more than one method to report a transaction or 
matter.  
The auditor plays a vital role in ensuring that managers act not in their own interests, but 
in the best interests of the stakeholders whose capital they control. As recent events in 
the corporate world have highlighted, the auditor’s role in corporate governance is in a 
state of crisis. Any movement toward harmonization of accounting standards must be 
pursued in conjunction with other reforms so as to improve the role of the auditor in 
corporate governance. 
